Immigration: The European Experience by Christian Dustmann & Tommaso Frattini
 
Immigration:  
The European Experience 
 
Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini 




 “Immigration: The European Experience”* 
 
Christian Dustmann, UCL and CReAM  





This paper first presents a brief historical overview of immigration in Europe. We then provide (and 
distinguishing  between  EU  and  non-EU  immigrants)  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  skill 
structures of immigrants and their labor market integration in the different European countries, their 
position in the wage distribution, and the situation of their children, and discuss the disadvantage of 
immigrants and their children relative to natives. We show that immigrants – in particular those 
from non-EU countries – are severely disadvantaged in most countries, even if we compare them to 
natives with the same measurable skills. We conclude with a discussion of the role of regulations 
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1. Introduction 
For most European countries, large scale immigration is a more recent phenomenon than for 
countries like Australia, the US, or Canada. For instance, while Germany and Spain today have 
foreign born populations similar to the  US in relative terms (14.5% and 13% of their total 
populations, respectively), the share of foreign born on the overall population in West Germany 
before 1960 and in Spain before the early 1990s was below 1%. In contrast, the foreign born 
population in the US was 12.5 percent in 2009, but also 13.6 percent in 1900. Immigration to 
Europe is also very heterogeneous: Different European countries have immigrant populations 
that are very different in terms of ethnicity, origin, and educational attainment. For instance, 
while more than 70% of the foreign born population in Ireland comes from within the EU, this 
share is only 21% in the neighboring UK, where almost one third of the immigrant population 
comes from South Asia.  
Why  are  immigrant  populations  so  different  across  countries?  And  how  are  the  different 
historical experiences of individual countries reflected in the current composition of the stock of 
immigrants and in their labor market integration? We start our paper with a brief overview of 
the history of migration in European countries, where we highlight differences and similarities 
across countries.  Based on the European Labor Force Survey we then analyze the composition 
of the stock  and the flows of immigration to Europe and study the degree of labor market 
integration of immigrants in different countries. We show that immigrants in all countries are 
disadvantaged relative to natives in terms of their employment probabilities as well as their 
occupational  distribution,  and  disproportionately  represented  in  the  bottom  deciles  of  the 
national  earnings  distributions.  The  disadvantage  is  particularly  pronounced  for  non-EU 
immigrants, who may face higher cultural and institutional barriers to access labor markets in 
European countries.  3 
 
The  children  of  immigrants,  and  particularly  those  of  non-EU  immigrants,  represent  in  all 
countries a larger share of the overall children population than their parents’ share is of the adult 
population. The economic disadvantage of immigrants is therefore a particular concern if it is 
transmitted  to  their  children.  We  show  that  in  all  countries  for  which  we  have  earnings 
information, the children of immigrants are disproportionately more likely to live in low income 
households than the children of natives.  
We conclude our paper with a brief discussion of possible explanations as to why immigrants 
are disadvantaged throughout Europe, even if we compare them with native-born individuals 
with  the  same  observable  characteristics.  We  hypothesize  that  one  reason  may  be  barriers 
through institutions, and non-meritocratic access conditions to certain occupations and labor 
market  segments,  and  we  provide  some  descriptive  evidence  that  is  compatible  with  this 
hypothesis.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we provide an overview of the history 
of migration in Europe, and discuss the role of undocumented immigration. Section 3 describes 
the European Labor Force Survey dataset. In section 4 we analyze the educational attainment 
and labor market outcomes of immigrants, while in section 5 we study immigrants’ position in 
the national wage distribution. Section 6 investigates the relative situation of the children of 
immigrants and natives. We discuss our findings and conclude in section 7. 
 
2. Migration to Europe -  A brief Historical Perspective 
We  commence  by  briefly  discussing  immigration  to  European  countries  after  WW2.  The 
heterogeneity in migrations experienced across countries is enormous over this period. While 
some countries experienced large immigrations over the second half of the last century, others 4 
 
have been predominantly emigrations countries, and others again have changed from emigration 
countries to immigration countries. Countries differ also in the type, origin and composition of 
their immigrant populations.  
 
Population Movements after World War II 
The peace treaties at the end of the second world war lay the foundation for the new geo-
political landscape of after-war Europe, and created large population movements within Europe 
and  into  Europe.  Countries  like  Germany  and  Austria  were  substantially  reduced  in  their 
national boundaries, and other countries incorporated new areas into their national geography. 
Further, the beginning of the cold war created a politically and economically divided Europe, 
with a new border separating Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe, and creating 
separate political structures and economic systems. The after-war period also saw a continuation 
of the process of de-colonization, with withdrawal of the old Colonial powers from their former 
colonies. Strong economic growth in some European countries in the decades between the miod-
1950’s and the mid-1970’s led to large immigration movements from the periphery of Europe 
into its centre, and from countries to which links existed through colonial histories. In addition, 
the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 and its subsequent expansion, 
establishing an ever larger common market with free movement of people, goods and capital 
affected migration movements. And finally, the collapse of the Soviet empire led to conflicts 
and refugee movements as a consequence of a worldwide political and economic re-structuring, 




Immediate after-war period 
An immediate consequence of the re-partitions and political separations following WWII were 
large  intra-European  movements,  due  to  displacement  and  forced  resettlement.  The  country 
foremost affected by immigration during the period after 1945 was Germany. According to Salt 
and Clout (1976), by 1950 7.8m refugees had found a new home in West Germany, and 3.5m 
refugees in East Germany. Refugees were largely displaced ethnic German populations from 
new Eastern block countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR, or refugees 
who resettled for political reasons. These movements gradually ebbed away as Eastern European 
countries became increasingly insulated, symbolized by the building of the Berlin wall in 1961.  
 
Economic expansion and de-colonization 
Starting in the early 1950s, European countries experienced a second large migration wave, 
quite different in nature from the first wave. This time the movement was one from Southern 
Europe, as well as non-European Mediterranean countries and former colonies, into Western 
and Northern  Europe. Reasons for these movements were  a combination of the tremendous 
economic expansion, due to reconstruction of the economies of Northern European countries, 
coupled with serious labor shortages, as well as de-colonization of former colonial powers. A 
most significant feature of these migrations was that they drew ethnically diverse populations 
into European countries which so far had been ethnically homogenous.   
Many European colonial powers like the UK, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal lost 
their  colonies  in  the  decades  after  the  Second  World  War.  Important  events  were  the 
independence of India and Pakistan from Great Britain in 1947, Ghana’s independence in 1957, 
marking the first independent African nation, Congo’s independence from Belgium in 1960, and 6 
 
Algeria’s independence from France in 1962. Population movements from the former colonies 
to the mother countries were initially facilitated by former colonial powers granting rights to 
citizens of former colonies. De-colonization let Europeans who had settled in former colonies, 
sometimes for several generations, migrate back after colonial rule had ceased, but it also saw 
citizens  of  former  colonies  moving  to  Europe,  sometimes  for  political,  but  more  often  for 
economic reasons.  During this period, countries like the Netherlands received immigrants from 
Indonesia  in  the  1950s  and  from  Surinam  in  early  1970s,  the  United  Kingdom  received 
immigrants from the Caribbean, Asia, and East Africa – with, for instance, 20.000 Ugandan 
Asians in 1972 alone migrating to the UK as a result of political persecution. After the Algerian 
war in 1962, France received one million Algerians of white ethnicity (McDonald 1965), as well 
as many Northern African immigrants. It is these populations and their children that were at the 
root of recent social tensions, for instance in the Netherlands in 2004 and in France in 2005. 
These  large  inflows  were  initially  quite  easily  absorbed,  due  to  the  economic  expansion  of 
Western and Northern Europe, and the accompanying need of their industries for low skilled 
labor. In fact, immigrants were largely welcomed and immigrations were encouraged. While 
former colonial powers like France and the UK drew mainly on their former colonies to satisfy 
demands  for  unskilled  labor,  other  countries,  like  Germany,  Austria,  or  the  Scandinavian 
countries, actively recruited workers predominantly from the Southern peripheries of Europe, 
the  Mediterranean  countries,  as  well  as  from  Turkey.  Recruitment  of  a  migrant  unskilled 
workforce  was  usually  regulated  by  bilateral  agreements.  An  important  feature  of  these 
migration movements was that they were considered as temporary, and migrants were expected 
to return to their home countries after the economic boom had ebbed. In the absence of any 
contractual  or  legal  arrangements  as  to  their  temporary  status,  however,  a  large  fraction  of 
immigrants settled permanently. By 1973, the total foreign population in Germany alone had 
grown to 3.9m, or 9.8% percent of the population. 7 
 
 This second large immigration wave came to a halt with the first oil crises in 1973, leading to 
an economic downturn and a sharp increase in unemployment in most Western and Northern 
European  countries.  Nevertheless,  immigration  did  not  cease  after  1973.  Many  immigrants 
settled more permanently and were joined by their families. As a consequence, migration into 
Northern  Europe  between  1973  and  1985  was  predominantly  characterized  by  family  re-
unification. 
The period between 1950 and 1973 saw opposite movements in Southern European countries. 
Southern Europe during the 1950’s and 1960’s was economically a mirror image of Northern 
Europe, with sluggish economic development and high unemployment. The booming North was 
a magnet for people, and Southern Europe was characterized over this period by out-migration, 
and to some extent return migration.  
Eastern and Central European countries during this period were hidden behind the iron curtain. 
Although they did not participate in the large economic boom experienced by many Northern 
European countries, there was substantial difference in economic growth and prosperity, which, 
in a similar way, led to migration movements mainly for economic reasons.  
 
Fall of the Berlin Wall 
A next big population movement was initiated in the late 1980’s by a liberalization of Soviet 
policy and accelerated by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. In an initial phase, liberalization led 
to  large  East-West  migrations,  predominantly  of  people  whose  movements  were  suppressed 
during the Soviet era. Most significant was the movement of Ethnic Germans from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union to Germany. In 1990 alone over 397,000 Ethnic Germans 
came to Germany from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. During the 1990s the 8 
 
inflow of Ethnic Germans from former Soviet Union remained high, with over 700,000 entering 
Germany between 1996 and 2001 (Glitz 2011). 
The collapse of Soviet rule in the early 1990s led to a wave of civil conflict and separations, 
with large displacements of civil populations. The Balkan wars led to large asylum and refugee 
migrations. This time however migrations were not only targeting Northern Europe, but also 
Southern  European  countries,  which  had,  partly  as  a  result  of  their  incorporation  into  the 
European  Union,  experienced  rapid  economic  development  and  convergence  to  Northern 
Europe  during  the  1980’s.  Immigration  was  not  only  limited  to  former  Western  European 
countries,  however.  The  fall  of  the  iron  curtain  and  the  transition  of  former  Soviet  Bloc 
countries to free market economies led to differential economic developments in these countries, 
triggering migration flows from the poorer countries to the richer countries. During the Balkan 
wars,  those  countries  who  either  had  already  large  populations  from  ex-Yugoslavia,  like 
Germany or Austria, and countries who were immediate neighbors, like Greece, experienced 
large in-migrations. This wave of immigration ebbed down towards the end of the 1990’s, when 
the conflicts ended. 
 
EU Eastern enlargement and beyond 
The next wave of movements in Europe was mainly internal, and triggered by the expansion of 
the  European  Union  towards  the  former  Easter  European  countries.  European  legislation 
foresees that citizens of countries that join the European Union can freely move across those 
countries. However, pre-existing member states may impose, during a 7-year transition period, 
limitations to the employment of citizens of new-member countries (see Dustmann, et al. 2003 
for details). After EU accession of 8 Central and Eastern European countries on May 1
st , 2004 9 
 
the UK, Sweden and Ireland allowed citizens of the new accession countries to work in their 
labor markets immediately, which lead to sizeable movements from particularly Poland (the 
largest of the new accession countries) into these countries. It is estimated that between 2004 
and 2008, Poland experienced the net outflow of over 300,000 citizens, or about 1% of the total 
population  (see  Dustmann,  Frattini,  Rosso  2011).  Also,  enlargement  led  to  movements  into 
other European countries like Italy and Spain. Although new EU citizens were allowed to freely 
travel to these countries, taking up an employee job was illegal, and led many new accession 
citizens to engage in illegal work relationships. Further, continuing conflicts around the world, 
and  improved  travel  and  information  technologies  dramatically  increased  the  pressure  on 
Europe’s  Southern  borders,  with  countries  like  Italy  and  Greece  receiving  large  inflows  of 
asylum and illegal immigrants, many arriving by boat on largely uncontrollable sea borders.  
Table 1 shows some numbers on the magnitude and the composition
1 of immigrant populations 
in different European countries as of 2007-2009, and contrasts them to the US. 
[Table 1 here] 
In many of the countries in the Table, the stock of immigrants in total population is above 10%. 
Southern  European  countries  and  the  Nordic  countries  tend  to  be  those  with  the  lowest 
immigrant populations, with the exception of Sweden (15%) and Spain (13%). Overall, more 
than 11% of the population in European countries is foreign-born. This is only one percentage 
point lower than the US. However, the composition of the immigrant population differs widely 
between Europe and the US. While in the US over 50% of the foreign born population comes 
from Latin America, this share is only 12% in Europe. Similarly, one in four immigrants in the 
US comes from South and East Asia, compared to only 11% in Europe. Within Europe, there is 
                                                 
1  EU15  countries:  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; New Member States 12 (NMS12): Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta; Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia. 10 
 
substantial heterogeneity across countries. The colonial heritage and cultural ties are evident in 
the composition of the immigrant population in Spain, with 47% of the foreign born residents 
coming  from  Latin  America;  France,  with  40%  of  immigrants  coming  from  North  Africa; 
Portugal, with 45% of immigrants from Africa and 21% from Latin America; and for the UK, 
with 29% of immigrants coming from Asia. 
The data in Table 1 are likely to be an underestimate of the total stock of immigrants residing in 
European countries, as they do not include undocumented immigrants. Quantifying the size of 
undocumented migration in Europe is difficult as EU member states do not apply comparable 
internal apprehension practices, and comparison of country-specific migration-control data is 
therefore not viable. Estimates of the undocumented populations will therefore have to rely on 
country-by-country estimates, which are likely to differ in their methodology, timeliness, and 
reliability. According to the recent estimates of Kovacheva and Vogel (2009), which are based 
on  collection  and  harmonization  of  estimates  from  several  national  sources,  the  number  of 
immigrants  illegally  residing  in  the  EU  15  countries  ranged  in  2008    between  1.8  and  3.3 
million, or between 0.46% and 0.83% of the total population. According to these estimates, 
between  7%  -  12%  of  the  total  EU  15  immigrant  population  would  be  undocumented.  In 
contrast, Hoefer et al. (2010) estimate that 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants, or about 28% 
of the total immigrant population, were living in the US as of January 2009.  Based on these 
estimates, undocumented immigrants are a much larger share of the population in the US than in 
Europe. However, the estimates of undocumented immigrants vary largely across EU countries. 
Table 2 is adapted from Vogel and Kovacheva (2009), and reports country-by country estimates 
of the magnitude of the unauthorized immigrant population in EU 15 countries in 2008, while 
the last row reports for comparison estimates for the US, based on Hoefer et al. (2010).  
[Table 2 here] 11 
 
The figures should be interpreted with caution, given the likely poor quality of estimates for the 
illegal  population  of  immigrants  in  the  European  countries.  The  estimates  suggest  that 
undocumented immigration is close to zero in the Scandinavian countries (except for Finland, 
where legal immigrants represent less than 3% of the total population see Table 1). On the other 
hand,  the  undocumented  population  is  estimated  to  be  much  larger  in  Southern  European 
countries (except for Spain) and in countries like the Netherlands, and the UK  The upper bound 
estimates for Portugal and the UK point at one in four immigrants being undocumented.  Note 
also that the size of the undocumented population in countries like Italy and Spain fluctuates 
considerably over time, due to repeated amnesties (see Fasani 2010). 
 
3. Data  
The study of European immigration is not straightforward, due to the scarcity of European-wide 
datasets.  Furthermore,  a  problem  for  multi-national  comparisons  is  the  definition  of 
“immigrants”.  In Anglo-Saxon countries “immigrants” are people who were born outside their 
country  of  residence.  In  countries  with  citizenship  based  on  blood  ancestry,  however,  a 
translation of “immigrants” can include people who were born in the country but are not citizens 
(e.g., children of Turkish nationals born in Germany). Likewise, people who were born abroad 
but of the right ancestry may not be classified as “immigrants”, as is the case for ethnic Germans 
born in Eastern Europe who moved to Germany after 1990. In this paper, we rely on information 
on country of birth to define immigrants in all countries. However, when we distinguish by areas 
of  origin  (including  EU  or  non-EU)  we  have  to  base  the  classification  on  nationality  for 
Germany, while we can still use country of birth for other countries.  12 
 
Our analysis is based on the European Labor Force Survey (EULFS). The EULFS is conducted 
in the 27 Member States of the European Union and 2 countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). It is a large quarterly household sample survey of people aged 15 and over 
as well as on persons outside the labor force. The National Statistical Institutes of each member 
country are responsible for selecting the sample, preparing the questionnaires, conducting the 
direct interviews among households, and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with 
the common coding scheme. The data collection started in 1983, though not all countries are 
included in all years. In spring 2002, the LFS sample size across the EU was about 1.5 million 
individuals. The EULFS collects information on respondents' personal circumstances (including 
nationality, country of  birth, and  years of residence in the host  country  if  applicable), their 
household structure and their labor market status during a reference period of one to four weeks 
immediately  prior  to  the  interview.  However,  the  EULFS  does  not  have  information  on 
respondents’ ethnicity. Also, information on household structure is not currently available for 
Denmark,  Finland,  Norway  and  Sweden.  Since  2009,  and  for  that  year  only,  the  EULFS 
provides, for some countries, information on individuals’ position in the national distribution of 
take home wages. This information is available for Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and 
Italy only
2.  
We  focus  our  analysis  on  15  Western  European  countries:  14  that  were  members  of  the 
European Union in 1995, and Norway. To have a large enough sample size, we pool together 
years  2007-2009.  The  main  reason  for  not  considering  the  new  East  European  accession 
countries is that their experience as immigrant-receiving countries is very recent, and most of 
them are still net emigration countries, so they still have a small immigrant population.  
                                                 
2 The current (2010) EULFS release contains the income decile variable for Greece, Portugal and the UK as well, but in 
these countries there are relevant coding errors, so we exclude them from our analysis. 13 
 
 
4. Education and Labor market outcomes 
In this section we investigate the labor market performance of immigrants in Europe. We first 
analyze immigrants’ educational achievements, relative to natives, in the different countries we 
consider.  The analysis relies on the variable “highest qualification achieved”, which is coded in 




Table 3 reports in the left columns the share of natives and immigrants with lower-secondary 
education  (ISCED  levels  0-2),  while  the  right  columns  report  the  share  of  natives  and 
immigrants with tertiary (ISCED levels 5 and 6) education, for each country. 
[Table 3 here] 
The numbers show that on average, across countries, immigrants in Europe are slightly less 
educated than natives: the share of individuals with tertiary (lower secondary) education is 24% 
(38%) among immigrants and 26% (32%) among natives. Further, there is a positive correlation 
between natives’ and immigrants’ qualifications. The correlation coefficient between the share 
of  tertiary  (lower  secondary)  educated  immigrants  and  natives  is  0.7  (0.6),  and  strongly 
statistically significant. Exceptions are Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, where 
natives are more educated than immigrants, and Ireland and Portugal, where immigrants have on 
                                                 
3 This classification may be problematic for two reasons. A first general problem is that, despite the efforts, ISCED may 
not reflect adequately the educational system of all countries, and can therefore lead to difficulties in cross-country 
comparisons. A second problem, specific to immigration, relates to the fact that foreign qualifications have to be first 
“translated” into a country-specific qualification, and then each country’s qualification is recoded according to ISCED. 
Unfortunately, this classification is the only available on education. 14 
 
average  a  higher  level  of  education  than  natives.  These  numbers  conceal  the  substantial 
differences  that  exist  across  countries  of  origin,  even  within  destination  country.  The  last 
column of Table 3 reports the (unweighted) standard deviations of the share of lower secondary 
educated immigrant from different origin groups within each country. It shows that in there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the educational attainment of different immigrant groups within 
the same destination country (see  Dustmann and Glitz 2011 for more details).  
 We investigate differences in educational attainments across countries of origin in Table 4, 
where we pool all European countries of destination.  
[Table 4 here] 
The figures in the table show that North American and Oceanian immigrants are substantially 
better  educated  than  natives:  almost  50%  of  individuals  from  these  groups  have  a  tertiary 
education,  and  only  14%  have  less  than  secondary  education.  On  the  contrary,  non-EU 
European and North African immigrants appear to have lower levels of education than natives, 
with about 50% of immigrant from these areas having at most lower secondary education. EU15 
immigrants  have  instead  a  similar  educational  distribution  to  non-immigrants,  though  more 
polarized with a higher share of both lower secondary and tertiary educated persons. Even more 
dramatic is the polarization of African and Asian immigrants, who display a higher tertiary 




Figure 1 reports differences in employment probabilities between immigrants and natives across 
the different countries we consider.  15 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
The  darker  bars  report  the  unconditional  immigrant-native  difference  in  employment 
probabilities (net of year and seasonality effects)
4. These figures show that in most countries 
immigrants  experience  a  substantial  labor  market  disadvantage.  In  Spain  and  Ireland 
employment rates of natives and immigrants are not significantly different, while in Greece, 
Italy and Portugal (all three immigration countries only since the late 1990’s), immigrants have 
higher probability of employment than natives. 
To what extent are these differences due to a different composition of the immigrant and native 
workforce in terms of age, education (see Table 3), and gender mix? The lighter bars of figure 1 
display differences in probability of employment after conditioning on these variables, as well 
as on the region of residence within a country (see footnote 4 for details). The figure shows 
clearly that if immigrants and natives lived in the same areas, and were identical to natives in 
their demographic characteristics, they would still be worse off in most countries. Moreover, 
conditioning on observable characteristics turns the immigrant-native employment differential 
negative also in Ireland, Italy and Portugal, and eliminates the positive difference in Greece. 
Thus, comparing immigrants to natives with the same observable characteristics, and who live in 
the same geographical areas, shows that immigrants have lower employment probabilities than 
natives in all countries, except for Greece, where any differences disappear. 
 
                                                 
4  Here  and  below,  “unconditional”  differences  in  employment  probabilities  between  immigrants  and  natives  are 
obtained as coefficients on a foreign-born dummy in a regression of a dummy for employment on the foreign-born 
dummy  and  year-quarter  interaction  dummies.  “Conditional”  differences  are  obtained  from  the  same  regression 
augmented with a gender dummy, regional dummies, dummies for five-year age brackets, and dummies for lower-
secondary, secondary, and tertiary education. We run separate regressions by country, and compute heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. 16 
 
We have shown above that the composition of the immigrant population varies across European 
countries, and that different origin groups differ, for instance, in their human capital. How do 
immigrants from different origin regions compare to natives within each of the countries we 
consider?    In  Table  5  we  report  employment  probability  differentials  where  we  distinguish 
between EU and non-EU immigrants, with natives of each country as the reference group. 
 [Table 5 here] 
Columns 1 and 2 show that in all countries (with the exception of Greece, Spain and Italy) EU 
immigrants  perform  better  than  non-EU  immigrants:  the  difference  in  EU  immigrants’ 
employment rate relative to natives is at least half that of non-EU immigrants. In columns 3-4 
and 5-6 we gradually make immigrants “more similar” to natives.  Columns 3 and 4 report the 
difference in employment probability of EU and non-EU immigrants relative to natives, after 
controlling for gender composition and regional distribution. The results are only marginally 
different from those in Columns (1) and (2). In columns 5 and 6, we control additionally for 
differences in age and education between the two populations. This eliminates any difference in 
the  employment  probability  of  natives  and  EU  immigrants  in  Finland,  France,  Greece,  and 
Norway, while EU immigrants have a higher probability of employment than natives in the UK. 
In the other countries, the employment gap ranges between 7.9 percentage points in Sweden and 
2.7 in Italy, in favor of natives. Non-EU immigrants are significantly more disadvantaged in all 
countries.  Even  if  they  had  the  same  characteristics  as  natives,  they  would  still  have  an 
employment  probability  that  is  20  percentage  points  lower  than  natives  in  Belgium,  16 
percentage points in Germany, 16 percentage points in the Netherlands and 17 percentage points 
in Sweden. 
   17 
 
Occupational Distribution 
We now consider a different dimension of immigrants’ labor market integration: occupational 
distributions, and how these differ between immigrants and natives.  
Table 6 reports the Duncan dissimilarity index for the distribution of EU (odd columns) and 
non-EU  (even  columns)  immigrants  and  natives  across  occupations  (at  1-digit  ISCO  level), 
corrected to account for sampling error
5. The index can be interpreted  as the percentage of 
immigrants that would be required to change occupation for immigrants and natives to have the 
same  occupational  distribution.  Therefore,  the  higher  the  index,  the  more  dissimilar  is  the 
occupational distribution of immigrants and natives.  
[Table 6 here] 
The first column of Table 6 reports the overall index for EU immigrants, while column 2 reports 
the overall index for non-EU immigrants, both relative to natives. The entries show that in most 
countries EU immigrants are more similar to natives in their occupational distribution than non-
EU immigrants. The exceptions are the two countries with the most important colonial past, 
France and the UK, where non-EU immigrants have an occupational distribution that is closer to 
natives’. This may be related to the long experience of extra-European migration to these two 
countries  from  their  former  colonies.  As  we  show  below,  the  occupational  distribution  of 
immigrants and natives becomes more similar with time spent in the host country.  
In  general,  Nordic  and  central  European  countries  tend  to  have  a  more  equal  occupational 
distribution of immigrants and natives, relative to Southern European countries. For instance, in 
Finland just above 1 percent of EU (13 percent of non-EU) immigrants would have to change 
                                                 
5 See Hellerstein et al. (2007) and Carrington and Troske (1997) for a similar approach to a different index. 18 
 
jobs to equalize the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives. In the Netherlands, this 
share is about 5 (15) percent , while in Italy 27.5 (36) percent and in Greece 32 (50) percent.  
One reason for the differences in the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives might 
simply be the diversity in the composition of the two populations, e.g. due to different education 
structures. To address this, we divide the population in three education groups based on the 
ISCED  (International  Standard  Classification  of  Education)  classification,  and  compute  the 
Duncan dissimilarity index within each group . We report the results in columns 3 to 8. The 
index tends to be lower for low education groups, and to increase with the level of education, 
especially for non-EU immigrants, although there are several exceptions. Columns 9 and 10 
report an average of the values of the Duncan index in each education group, weighted by the 
share of each group in the total population. This gives a measure of occupational dissimilarity 
conditional on the  educational composition of immigrants  and natives in each country. The 
values  of  columns  9  and  10  are,  especially  for  non-EU  immigrants,  smaller  than  those  of 
columns 1 and 2, but the pattern is very similar. This indicates therefore that differences in the 
educational composition are not the main reason for the differences occupational distribution of 
immigrants and natives. 
How  do  immigrants  assimilate  in  the  host  country  labor  market?  Do  they  become  more 
“similar”  to  natives  in  terms  of  their  occupational  distribution  as  their  stay  in  the  country 
increases? Figure 2 suggests that this is indeed the case. 
[Figure 2 here] 
In the figure we plot the value of the Duncan index versus years of residence in the host country 
for the five largest EU destination countries: Germany, France, Spain, Italy and UK. The top 19 
 
graph reports the index for EU immigrants, while the bottom graph displays the index for non-
EU immigrants. 
In all countries and for both EU and non-EU immigrants, the dissimilarity index decreases with 
years  since  migration:  the  longer  the  time  spent  in  the  host  country,  the  more  similar  the 
occupational  distribution  of  immigrants  and  natives  becomes.  An  interesting  feature  of  the 
figure is that, especially for non-EU immigrants, the relative ranking of countries remains quite 
stable  over  time.  Italy  is  consistently  the  country  with  the  largest  dissimilarity  between  the 
occupational distribution of immigrants and natives (except for EU immigrants who have been 
in  the  country  for  more  than  ten  years).  Conversely,  the  UK  is,  especially  for  non-EU 
immigrants,  the  country  with  the  highest  occupational  similarity  (although  20%  of  non-EU 
immigrants who reside in the UK for no more than two years would have to change jobs for 
their occupational distribution to equalize that of natives). The changes of the index over time 
could also be due to changes in cohort composition, as well as selective out-migration. Changes 
in  cohort  composition  may  be  particularly  relevant  in  countries  like  Spain  and  Italy  where 
immigration is a recent phenomenon, and immigrants who were in the country for more than ten 
years in 2007-2009 may differ substantially from later cohorts. 
The analysis of the index of dissimilarity has shown that immigrants and natives are employed 
in different occupations, but it does not allow establishing whether immigrants are employed in 
“better” or “worse” occupations than natives.  
We now measure the occupational status with the Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status 
(ISEI).  The  ISEI  is  an  index  of  occupational  prestige  which  captures  the  attributes  of 
occupations  that  convert  education  into  income
6.  Higher  values  of  the  index  correspond  to 
                                                 
6 See Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992) for a description of the index and its construction. 20 
 
occupations which reward education more, while lower values of the index denote occupations 
that have lower returns to education. 
Figure 3 shows the differences in the distribution of EU (dashed line) and non-EU (dotted line) 
immigrants relative to natives across the ISEI scale. If immigrants and natives had the same 
occupational distribution, then both lines would be horizontal at 0. The figure shows clearly that 
natives are more concentrated than immigrants in the more skilled (higher indexed) occupations. 
Within immigrants, non-EU immigrants are more concentrated than EU nationals in less skilled 
occupations. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Is  this  pattern  common  to  all  countries?  We  investigate  the  cross-country  heterogeneity  in 
occupational  distributions  in  Table  7,  where  we  report  the  average  standard  deviation 
differences in the ISEI index between immigrants and natives in each country. 
[Table 7 here] 
Columns 1 and 2 report unconditional differences, controlling for year and seasonality only. 
Non-EU immigrants (column 2) are employed in lower skilled occupation than natives in all 
countries, except for Ireland and Portugal, where the average value of the index is the same for 
both extra-EU immigrants and natives. In the UK, non-EU immigrants are on average employed 
in  slightly  more  skilled  occupations  than  natives  (7%  of  a  standard  deviation).  Southern 
European  countries  (except  for  Portugal)  are  those  where  the  gap  between  immigrants  and 
natives is highest, between 2/3 and 4/5 of a standard deviation, while in Nordic countries the gap 
is about 1/3 of a standard deviation, and a bit lower in Finland. EU immigrants, conversely, have 
markedly  different  performances  in  different  European  countries.  In  Austria,  Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Portugal they are employed in more skilled occupations than 21 
 
natives, with an advantage as high as 1/3 of a standard deviation in Portugal. Conversely, in 
Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the UK EU immigrants are employed in less 
skilled occupations than natives. Interestingly, in France and in the UK the gap with natives in 
occupational prestige is higher for EU than for non-EU immigrants. 
In columns 3 and 4 we control for differences in gender composition, regional distribution, age 
structure, and education of immigrants natives. This has important effects for both EU and non-
EU immigrants. Once individual characteristics are controlled for, EU immigrants turn out to be 
employed in less skilled occupations than natives in all countries, except for Belgium where 
there is no significant difference, and for Finland, where the occupational advantage of EU 
immigrants is even magnified. Among non-EU immigrants, the difference turns negative also in 
Portugal and Ireland, where there was no unconditional difference with natives, and in the UK. 
Non-EU immigrants in the UK now display an occupational gap of over 10% of a standard 
deviation relative to British natives. 
The previous figures show the distribution of immigrants relative to natives across occupational 
categories.  But  how  are  immigrants  allocated  to  occupational  categories  within  larger 
occupational  groups?  This  is  shown  in  columns  5  and  6,  where  we  condition  on  dummy 
variables  for  one-digit  ISCO  occupations.  Thus,  the  entries  in  these  columns  measure  the 
difference  in  occupational  prestige  between  immigrants  and  natives  within  one  digit 
occupations. Although the gap reduces dramatically in all countries, it is still negative for most 
countries for EU immigrants, and negative and significant everywhere for non-EU immigrants. 
Thus,  even  within  broad  occupational  classes,  non-EU  immigrants  are  employed  in  more 
unskilled occupations than natives. EU immigrants are more similar to natives: : in countries 
like  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands,  there  are  no  differences  in  occupational  prestige  between 22 
 
natives and EU immigrant within the same occupation group, while in Sweden EU immigrants 
are employed in slightly more skilled jobs, within the same occupation group. 
 
5. Immigrant’s position in the earnings distribution 
As discussed above, there are no good Europe-wide dataset with reliable wage measures, and 
sufficient numbers of observations to investigate immigrant populations. For this section we 
therefore use information on individuals’ position in the national distribution of monthly take 
home pay from main job from the 2009 EULFS. We focus here on Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France  and  Italy,  the  only  countries  where  the  information  is  available,  and  consider  all 
employed individuals with information on position in the distribution of earnings. 
Figure 4 displays the share of natives, EU, and non-EU immigrants in each decile of the national 
earnings distribution. If immigrants and natives were equally distributed, the three lines would 
be flat, and overlap. 
[Figure 4 here] 
The Figure shows clearly that this is not the case. Non-EU immigrants have on average lower 
earnings than EU immigrants and natives. About 15% of non-EU immigrants are in the bottom 
decile  of  the  earning  distribution,  with  another  15%  in  the  second  decile.  Among  EU 
immigrants, 14% are in the first decile, and about 13% in the second, while slightly less than 
10% of natives are in each of these two lowest deciles. The distribution of immigrants across 
deciles  is  decreasing,  with  an  increasingly  lower  share  of  immigrants  in  higher  deciles. 
However, the decrease is much faster among non-EU immigrants, while the distribution of EU 
immigrants is relatively flat at around 9% above the median. 23 
 
Immigrants, and especially non-EU immigrants are therefore clearly disadvantaged in terms of 
income  relative  to  natives,  and  are  over-represented  in  the  bottom  part  of  the  income 
distribution. 
 
We explore more in detail differences across areas of origin in Table 8, where we report the 
share of natives and immigrants in each decile of the national earnings distribution, and we 
distinguish between immigrant groups. 
[Table 8 here] 
Immigrants from all areas are more likely than natives to be in the bottom deciles of the earnings 
distribution, except for those from North America and Oceania. Latin American immigrants are 
most disadvantaged: 21% are in the first decile, and a further 20% is in the second decile. 
Citizens of the new EU member states are also among the most disadvantaged groups, with 19% 
of them in the bottom decile, and 17% in the second decile.  
For  most  origin  groups,  the  distribution  over  earnings  deciles  is  roughly  decreasing.  The 
exceptions are North Americans and Oceanians, for which the distribution is increasing (though 
not monotonically), and EU15 immigrants. The latter group has a clearly U-shaped distribution, 
with higher density at the two tails, and a lower concentration in the central deciles. 
In  Table  9  we  study  the  probability  of  being  in  the  lowest  earnings  decile,  and  analyze 
differences  across  destination  countries,  and  we  distinguish  between  EU  and  non-EU 
immigrants. 
[Table 9 here] 24 
 
Columns 1 and 2 report differences between EU (column1) and non-EU (column 2) immigrants 
in the unconditional probability of being in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution (net of 
seasonality effects)
7.  In all countries both EU and non-EU immigrants are more likely than 
natives to be in the bottom decile, except for Finland where there are no differences between 
natives and EU immigrants. Italy is the country where EU immigrants experience the highest 
disadvantage relative to natives: their probability of being in the bottom decile is 9 percentage 
points higher than natives, while it is just above 3 percentage points for EU immigrants in 
Belgium and Germany. Italy is also the only country where EU immigrants are worse off than 
non-EU immigrants, relative to natives. Conversely, in Finland extra-EU immigrants are more 
than 11 percentage points more likely than natives and EU immigrants to be at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution.  
In columns 3 and 4 we investigate to what extent the differences in the probability of being at 
the bottom of the distribution of earnings are due to differences in immigrants’ and natives’ 
characteristics. We report probability differentials after accounting for differences in gender, 
age, and education, and for the regional distribution of immigrants and natives, which accounts 
for the fact that immigrants are likely to settle in the areas with higher wage levels. Conditioning 
on these characteristics reduces slightly the difference between natives and EU immigrants in 
Germany and Italy, while it has no effect in other countries. As regards non-EU immigrants, 
after controlling for all observable characteristics, the probability of being at the bottom of the 
earnings  distribution  increases  in  Finland  and  France,  while  it  decreases  in  Belgium  and 
Germany and is unaffected in Italy. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we compare immigrants and 
                                                 
7 The unconditional differences in the probability of being in the bottom decile of the distribution of earnings between 
immigrants and natives are obtained as coefficients on EU and non-EU immigrant dummies in a regression of a dummy 
for being in the bottom decile of the national earnings distribution on the foreign-born dummies and quarter dummies. 
“Conditional” differences are obtained from the same regression augmented with a gender dummy, regional dummies, 
dummies for five-year age brackets, dummies for lower-secondary, secondary, and tertiary education, and dummies for 
1-digit ISCO codes. We run separate regressions by country, and compute heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 25 
 
natives within the same broad occupation  group (1-digit  ISCO code).  As expected, in most 
countries controlling for 1 digit occupation makes the probability of being in the bottom decile 
more similar between immigrants and natives. However, except for Germany, even within the 
same broad occupation group immigrants are more likely than natives to be at the bottom of the 
distribution of earnings.  
 
6. Children of Immigrants 
The economic and social integration of the descendants of immigrants is likely to be one of the 
key challenges for many European countries over the next decades. As we show in section 2, 
many  European  countries  have  only  a  short  history  of  immigration,  but  the  children  of 
immigrants are a sizable and increasing fraction of their populations. 
Table 10 reports the share of children with immigrant parents over all children under the age of 
15,  for  all  the  countries  for  which  we  have  information  on  household  composition.  We 
distinguish between children of EU and non-EU immigrants, and of mixed couples, where we 
differentiate between different parental mixes. We also report, for comparison, the share of EU 
and non-EU immigrants among the adult population (15 and over).  
[Table 10 here] 
In all countries the descendants of non-EU immigrants account for a larger share of the children 
population than their parents’ share of the adult population, while the fraction of children of EU 
immigrants in the children population is slightly smaller than the share of their parents’ in the 
adult population. Across all countries, EU immigrants account for 2.6% of the adult population, 
while their children make up 1.9% of the population below the age of 15. Non-EU immigrants 
instead represent 6% of the adult population, but their children account for 9.4% of all children. 26 
 
This  is  interesting,  and  may  suggest  a  higher  fertility  of  non-EU  immigrants,  which  will 
importantly shape the ethnic mix in the future.  Moreover, almost 8.5% of children are from 
mixed couples, with 3% having a native and an EU immigrant parent and over 5% having a 
native and a non-EU parent. Children of mixed EU/non-EU couples make up only 0.3% of all 
children.  
For  the  countries  where  we  have  both  information  on  individuals’  position  in  the  national 
distribution of earnings and information on household structure (Belgium, Germany, France, 
and Italy) we can study the extent to which children of immigrants are concentrated in poorest 
households.  The  EULFS  does  not  provide  information  on  household  income.  We  therefore 
define as “low income” households those households where both the reference person and their 
spouse (if there is a spouse) are in the bottom decile of the earnings  distribution. The first 
column of Table 11 shows that the share of households that satisfy this criterion is about 5% in 
Belgium, 4% in Italy and France, and just over 1% in Germany, while column 2 shows that the 
share  of  children  living  in  “low-income”  households  is  slightly  lower  than  the  share  of 
households  in  that  category.  The  remaining  columns  of  Table  11  report  the  proportion  of 
children  of  immigrants  or  of  mixed  couples  out  of  all  children  that  live  in  a  low-income 
household, defined in this way.  
[Table 11 here] 
In all countries, the children of non-EU immigrants are much more likely than the children of 
natives to belong to a low-income household. For instance, in Italy the children of non-EU 
immigrants represent less than 8% of all children, but 20% of all children from low-income 
households.  In  Belgium,  less  than  11%  of  all  children  are  the  descendants  of  non-EU 
immigrants, but they account for 23% of children in “low income” households. Similarly, the 
children of EU immigrants are over-represented among low- income households in all countries 27 
 
except for Germany
8. Italy is the country where the children of EU immigrants are relatively 
more likely to be from “low income” households: they account for less than 2% of all children, 
but 5.5% of children from low income households. On the other hand, the percentage of children 
of mixed couples in low income households is lower than the percentage of all children in these 
households. If belonging to a poor household restricts future opportunities (see e.g. Blanden et 
al. (2007), Corak (2006), Jäntti et al. (2006), Solon (2002) for evidence), then these numbers 
suggest  that  the  disadvantage  of  immigrants,  particularly  from  non-EU  countries,  which  we 
illustrate in the previous sections, may carry over to their children. Research by Dustmann, 
Frattini and Lanzara (2012) on the educational attainments of the children of immigrants is 
partly in line with this: They find that gaps in test scores between children of immigrants and 
children  of  natives  in  different  countries  are  strongly  related  to  their  parents’  achievement. 
However, their results also show that differences in parental background alone do not account 
everywhere  for  the  entire  immigrant-native  achievement  gap.  In  traditional  immigration 
countries, like the Anglo-Saxon countries, differences in test score gaps between children of 
immigrants and children of natives disappear after conditioning on family characteristics. In 
many European countries, instead, significant differences in test scores between natives and 
immigrants remain, even after controlling for family characteristics. This suggests that there 
may be considerable diversity in educational institutions between countries, possibly related to 
their experience with larger scale immigration. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provides an overview of immigration to Europe, and of the experience of immigrants 
in the European labor markets. Our brief historical review shows that the different historical 
                                                 
8 Note however that the sample of children from “low income” households in Germany is very small. 28 
 
circumstances  of  European  countries  (like  their  colonial  past)  as  well  as  their  economic 
developments, and the demand for labor of their industries in the period after the Second World 
War,  led  to  different  immigration  intensities  from  different  origin  countries.  As  a  result, 
different countries in Europe today are home to very dissimilar immigrant populations, in terms 
of origin, ethnicity, and education. Further, while some countries were home to large immigrant 
populations already in the 1960’s, others experienced large immigration only over the last two 
decades. Overall, however, large-scale immigration, and in particular immigration from remote 
parts of the world, is a far more recent phenomenon for any European country, in comparison to 
the US.  
Across all countries in Europe, immigrants tend to have lower levels of education than natives, 
with  the  exception  of  the  UK.  There  is  a  large  variation  in  educational  attainments  of 
immigrants  according  to  their  origin  countries.  Further,  immigrants  tend  to  have  lower 
employment probabilities. Similarly, we find that in most countries immigrants hold jobs that 
are lower  ranked in terms of their income potential, even  conditional  on education. This is 
particularly the case for non-EU immigrants, who are employed in lower ranked occupations 
than natives in all countries.  
Investigation of the position of immigrants in the overall wage distribution of the receiving 
countries is – due to data availability - restricted to a subset of countries: Belgium, Germany, 
Finland,  France  and  Italy.  The  picture  that  emerges  is  in  line  with  our  previous  findings: 
Immigrants are predominantly positioned at the lower parts of the overall wage distributions. 
Again, we establish large differences according to origin country: While immigrants from the 
EU15  countries  are  fairly  similarly  distributed  across  wage  distribution  deciles  to  natives, 
immigrants from non-OECD countries are more likely than natives to be at the bottom of the 
wage distribution. Consistent with our results on employment probabilities and occupational 29 
 
distribution, differences in education and demographic characteristics between immigrants and 
natives do not explain these wage differences. 
Disadvantage  seems  to  be  transferred  to  the  next  generation:  We  show  that  an  over-
proportionally large fraction of the children of immigrants, in particular those from non-EU 
countries, grow up in households that are at the very bottom of the income distribution. About 3 
percent of all households consist of parents who are both in the lowest decile of the earnings 
distribution (or a single parent who is). These households have about 2.5 percent of all children 
below the age of 15. However, 3.6 percent of all children with EU-immigrant background live in 
such households, and nearly 20 percent of all children with a non-EU immigrant background. 
These  numbers  are  quite  dramatic,  and  suggest  that  disadvantage  and  poverty  affects  a 
substantial fraction of immigrant children. 
What are the conclusions we can draw from this? The picture which emerges for Europe’s 
immigration experience is one of considerable heterogeneity of immigrant populations across 
the different recipient countries, in terms of ethnicity and country of origin, as well as in terms 
of education. Across all countries, it seems that immigrants are economically disadvantaged, 
even if we compare them to natives with the same characteristics. This disadvantage is more 
pronounced for immigrants from non-EU countries. As we also point out, in comparison with 
the US, immigration to Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus, one reason for the 
disadvantaged situation of immigrants may be that institutions in European countries have not 
yet been sufficiently adapted to accommodate foreign born individuals. The large inflows of 
immigrants into most European countries over the last decades were seldom accompanied by a 
clear immigration policy or strategies about the long-term integration into economic and social 
structures. For instance, access to many jobs may require types of “social capital” immigrants 
usually do not have, or access may not be based on meritocratic considerations only. Also, 30 
 
recognition of education and experience acquired in the home countries may be difficult, due to 
rigid regulations. This might be more of a problem for non-EU immigrants, as EU laws facilitate 
access of EU immigrants to labor markets of EU member states.  On the other hand, in countries 
like the US, with a long history of large-scale immigration, institutions may have adjusted over 
the decades and centuries.  
To  investigate  this  further  is  in  our  view  an  interesting  and  exciting  research  agenda,  with 
important implications for policy. Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, we would 
like to conclude with some evidence which is in line with this hypothesis. As we explain above, 
there is some considerable variation across European countries in their exposure to immigration 
over the period since 1950. This allows us to address the question whether the employment gap 
between immigrants and natives, or the occupational segregation, is larger in countries with a 
more  recent  immigration  experience.  In  Figures  5  and  6  we  plot  the  index  of  occupational 
dissimilarity between recent immigrants (who have been in the country for at most two years) 
and natives, and the gap in employment probability gap against the share of foreign born in 2010 
over the share of foreign born in 1960
9, for the European countries in our data set. The latter is 
an indicator for the length of “exposure” that countries have to foreign born individuals.  
[Figure 5 and Figure 6 here] 
The  figures  clearly  illustrate  that  both  occupational  dissimilarity  and  employment  gaps  are 
larger for countries where the ratio of the foreign born share in 2010 to 1960 is larger.  In 
particular, a longer exposure to immigration has a greater effect on the labor market assimilation 
of non-EU immigrants, while it does not impact on employment probability differential for EU 
immigrants.  
                                                 
9 Data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Historical immigration figures are not available for 
Germany. 31 
 
Although  these  figures  are  merely  suggestive  and  have  to  be  evaluated  with  care,  they  are 
compatible  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  disadvantage  of  immigrant  populations  and  their 
children  is  partly  related  to  institutions  and  perhaps  the  accessibility  of  labor  markets  on 
meritocratic  grounds.  To  explore  this  further,  we  plot  in  figures  7  and  8  the  index  of 
occupational dissimilarity and the employment probability gap  for recent immigrants relative to 
natives against the 2008 OECD index of strictness of employment protection legislation.
10 This 
index  measures  the  procedures  and  costs  involved  in  dismissing  individuals  or  groups  of 
workers, or in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts, and  takes 
values on a six-point scale, with higher values corresponding to stricter regulation. 
[Figures 7 and 8 here] 
Figure  7  shows  that  recent  immigrants  in  countries  with  stricter  employment  protection 
legislation  exhibit  an  occupational  distribution  that  is  more  distinct  from  that  of  natives, 
especially for non-EU immigrants.  This suggests that in these countries, access to particular 
occupations is more difficult. However, the gap relative to natives in employment probabilities 
does not seem to be correlated with the index of employment protection legislation. If anything, 
it displays a negative correlation with the employment gaps of EU immigrants. 
Thus,  comparisons  of  figures  5  with  7    warns  against  too  simplistic  interpretations  of  one 
specific  feature  of  host  countries’  institutions  as  a  reason  for  immigrants’  labor  market 
disadvantage. Nevertheless, we believe that institutions may play an important part in explaining 
some of the findings presented in this paper.  Identifying those that facilitate the assimilation of 
immigrants is an important area of future research.   
                                                 
10 Similarly, Angrist and Kugler (2003) and D’Amuri and Peri (2011) argue that the cross-country differences in the 
impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives across Europe might be due to differences in the 
flexibility of national labor markets.  32 
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Tables 






Composition of immigrant population by area of origin 


















Austria  15.68  17.55  18.7  51.18  3.58  1.2  5.44  1.07  1.29 
Belgium  11.76  41.53  6.45  13.83  18.09  10.96  5.48  1.16  2.5 
Germany  14.5  25.36  8.38  46.9  7.16  2.33  6.14  2.14  1.6 
Denmark  7.98  20.05  5.39  26.27  16.12  4.76  16.75  8.04  2.63 
Spain  13.09  13.83  13.76  3.89  15.13  2.86  3.28  0.65  46.6 
Finland  2.71  29.86  10.51  33.75  7.16  5.08  8.89  2.73  2.02 
France  10.66  27.57  2.99  6.11  40.23  12.08  6.79  1.56  2.67 
Greece  7.79  5.85  12.89  61.34  11.98  1.02  4.36  2.21  0.35 
Ireland*  15.59  40.16  32.66  3.21  1.54  5.71  9.59  5.6  1.53 
Italy  7.41  11.37  18.11  26.72  14.03  5.48  11.27  1.81  11.2 
Netherlands  10.66  17.39  3.57  16.64  17.22  5.86  17.45  2.51  19.38 
Norway  8.69  30.4  5.54  14.16  11.22  7.58  20.99  4.62  5.49 
Portugal  6.48  18.51  3.06  8.31  0.23  45.04  1.73  2  21.12 
Sweden  15.16  26.33  8.2  21.56  20.45  4.37  10.8  1.55  6.73 
UK  11.34  18.08  13.47  3.56  4.62  16.93  29.05  7.67  6.61 
Total  11.27  20.61  10.63  18.91  15.39  8.34  11.25  2.83  12.03 
USA  12.50  7.44  3.23  2.57  2.82  3.04  24.75  2.79  53.37 
Column 1 reports the share of immigrants in the total population of each country. 
Columns 2-9 report the composition of the immigrant population of each country by country of 
origin. 
Immigrants are defined as “foreign born” in all countries in the first column. In columns 2-9, 
they are defined as “foreign born” in all countries, except for Germany where they are defined as 
“foreign nationals”. 
*Data refer to years 2008-09 only. 
 Source: Europe: EU-LFS, years 2007, 2008 and 2009; USA: 2006-2008 American Community 
Survey 3-Year Estimates, our elaboration based on US Census Bureau Table B05006 
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Table 2: Estimates of undocumented immigrants, 2009 
As a % of total population  As a % of immigrant population 
Min  Max  Min  Max 
Austria*  0.22%  0.65%  2.2%  6.5% 
Belgium*  0.82%  1.24%  9.4%  14.2% 
Germany  0.24%  0.56%  2.7%  6.3% 
Denmark  0.02%  0.09%  0.3%  1.7% 
Spain*  0.62%  0.78%  6.1%  7.7% 
Finland  0.15%  0.23%  6.6%  9.9% 
France  0.28%  0.63%  4.9%  11.0% 
Greece*  1.53%  1.86%  9.1%  19.2% 
Ireland*  0.68%  1.41%  6.7%  13.8% 
Italy*  0.47%  0.77%  9.5%  15.7% 
Netherlands*  0.38%  0.80%  9.1%  19.2% 
Norway  -  -  -  - 
Portugal*  0.75%  0.94%  18.4%  23.0% 
Sweden*  0.09%  0.13%  1.6%  2.4% 
UK  0.68%  1.41%  11.4%  23.6% 
EU 15  0.46%  0.83%  6.6%  11.9% 
USA  3.50%  28.4% 
The table reports minimum and maximum estimates of the size of the  undocumented immigrant 
population for each country in 2008, expressed a share of the total country population or as a share 
of the total immigrant population. 
* denotes low-quality estimates 
Source: Vogel and Kolacheva (2009) for European countries. Our calculations based on Hoefer et 
al. (2010) for the US. 
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Table 3: Immigration and education 
  
% with lower secondary 






  Natives  Immigrants  Natives  Immigrants 
Austria  16.33  33.93  17.51  18.07  14.00 
Belgium  29.03  42.72  32.8  28.4  15.92 
Germany  10.47  37.53  27.02  19.31  15.93 
Denmark  23.78  27.10  33.18  33.41  10.11 
Spain  50.72  40.60  30.15  24.38  19.70 
Finland  19.59  24.54  36.75  31.86  10.65 
France  28.38  46.07  27.58  23.98  12.68 
Greece  39.25  46.08  22.9  15.69  19.09 
Ireland  33.04  18.51  31.32  46.34  10.43 
Italy  48.36  45.32  13.62  12.85  13.19 
Netherlands  27.18  37.91  31.14  25.91  12.71 
Norway  19.90  27.02  34.01  38.51  12.34 
Portugal  74.69  52.41  13.01  21.82  14.01 
Sweden  15.31  25.18  30.9  31.94  9.19 
UK  30.00  24.28  30.57  33.96  6.79 
Total  31.74  38.05  25.83  23.51  15.4 
The table reports the percentage of immigrants and natives in each country with low (column 1) 
and high (column 2 education). Column 3 reports the standard deviation of the share of individuals 
with lower secondary education across different immigrant groups within each country. The sample 
is restricted to working age population older than 25, not in full-time education and not in military 
service. 
We define immigrants as “foreign born” in all countries. 
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Table 4: Immigration and education, by area of origin 
 
% with lower 
secondary education 
% with tertiary 
education 
Natives  31.74  25.83 
EU15  35.08  29.35 
NMS12  23.40  21.03 
Other Europe  49.01  14.74 
North Africa and near Middle East  50.98  20.52 
Other Africa  39.01  27.84 
South and East Asia  40.04  26.26 
North America and Oceania  14.10  49.55 
Latin America  37.19  22.79 
All immigrants  38.05  23.51 
The table reports the percentage of natives and immigrants from each area of origin 
with  low  (column  1)  and  high  (column  2)  education,  pooling  all  destination 
countries. The sample is restricted to working age population older than 25, not in 
full-time education and not in military service. 
We define immigrants as “foreign born” in all countries, except for Germany where 
they are defined as foreign nationals. 
Source: EU-LFS, years 2007, 2008 and 2009 
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Table 5: Immigrant-native employment rate differentials  
EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Austria  -0.058***  -0.128***  -0.048***  -0.129***  -0.059***  -0.118*** 
Belgium  -0.088***  -0.207***  -0.062***  -0.195***  -0.029***  -0.197*** 
Germany  -0.053***  -0.219***  -0.067***  -0.227***  -0.032***  -0.162*** 
Denmark  -0.028***  -0.118***  -0.029***  -0.121***  -0.034***  -0.146*** 
Spain  -0.006  -0.003  -0.008  -0.011*  -0.059***  -0.044*** 
Finland  0.032*  -0.122***  0.030*  -0.119***  -0.013  -0.150*** 
France  -0.065***  -0.135***  -0.074***  -0.151***  -0.010  -0.129*** 
Greece  0.012**  0.040***  0.045***  0.026***  0.003  0.003 
Ireland  0.015***  -0.028***  0.013***  -0.027***  -0.035***  -0.130*** 
Italy  0.042***  0.048***  0.044***  0.010***  -0.027***  -0.032*** 
Netherlands  -0.053***  -0.149***  -0.043***  -0.147***  -0.061***  -0.156*** 
Norway  0.019*  -0.100***  0.014  -0.105***  -0.009  -0.108*** 
Portugal  0.069***  0.041***  0.069***  0.042***  -0.029***  -0.022*** 
Sweden  -0.090***  -0.158***  -0.094***  -0.167***  -0.079***  -0.174*** 
UK  0.037***  -0.073***  0.033***  -0.076***  0.013**  -0.101*** 
Year  &  quarter 
effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Gender  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Education  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
The table reports differences in employment probability between EU (columns 1-3-5) or non-EU 
(columns 2-4-6) immigrants and natives. The values are the estimated coefficients of separate 
regressions by country of a dummy for having a job on dummies for EU and non-EU immigrants. 
Separate  regressions  are  run  for  each  country.  The  sample  are  individuals  in  working-age 
population not in military service and not in education or training. We define an individual as in 
employment if she is employed or self-employed.  
Year and quarter effects: year-quarter interaction dummies. Gender: dummy for female. Age: 
dummies  for  five-year  age  groups.  Education:  dummies  for  lower  secondary,  secondary  and 
tertiary education. 
* difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 5%, *** difference significant at 1% 
Source: EU-LFS, years 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
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Table 6: Dissimilarity in occupational distribution 
Overall index 
of dissimilarity 
Index of dissimilarity by educational level  Weighted 
average across 
education    Low  Medium  High 
   EU 
Non-
EU  EU 
Non-
EU  EU 
Non-
EU  EU 
Non-
EU  EU 
Non-
EU 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Austria  11.4  34.4  10.2  30.5  11.7  32.9  9.6  19.4  11.1  30.0 
Belgium  9.7  18.4  9.5  12.7  7.7  12.8  10.1  16.5  9.0  14.2 
Germany  12.2  26.1  12.1  16.1  11.6  19.5  0.1  13.4  8.6  17.4 
Denmark  4.1  18.3  1.8  14.5  7.6  18.1  4.1  12.8  5.0  15.5 
Spain  17.1  31.4  12.6  21.4  31.9  31.0  20.0  29.7  19.8  26.6 
Finland  1.2  13.4  2.1  14.8  6.7  12.0  8.4  19.5  6.6  15.3 
France  17.5  12.2  25.0  14.6  8.8  6.7  6.7  13.2  12.0  10.6 
Greece  31.9  50.0  32.3  43.9  33.7  45.5  18.5  58.8  29.3  48.4 
Ireland  12.1  19.4  9.0  12.7  19.1  20.4  14.8  12.8  15.2  15.8 
Italy  27.5  36.2  19.7  19.8  41.7  42.9  19.8  44.5  29.8  34.5 
Netherlands  5.4  14.8  8.1  12.9  4.7  9.6  2.0  11.2  4.7  11.0 
Norway  10.4  17.2  11.3  9.4  9.0  19.2  9.7  19.6  9.7  17.3 
Portugal  8.3  12.2  5.0  15.3  15.2  26.6  6.9  15.6  7.0  17.2 
Sweden  4.7  20.8  6.0  19.6  1.8  21.0  8.3  25.8  4.5  22.3 
UK  12.5  9.9  18.7  15.3  18.1  12.2  2.8  4.4  13.1  10.3 
The table reports the Duncan dissimilarity index for the distribution of EU (odd columns) and 
non-EU (even columns) immigrants and natives across 1-digit ISCO occupations. Columns 1-2 
reports the overall index. Columns 3-8 report the index by education group. Columns 9 and 10 
report the average of the index by education group weighted by the share of total population in 
each education group. 
Source: EULFS, 2007-2009 
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Table 7: Immigrant-native occupational differences 
   EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Austria  0.075***  -0.584***  -0.103***  -0.429***  -0.053***  -0.047*** 
Belgium  0.039***  -0.350***  -0.010  -0.294***  -0.006  -0.082*** 
Germany  -0.181***  -0.509***  -0.103***  -0.295***  -0.049***  -0.066*** 
Denmark  0.064**  -0.310***  -0.076***  -0.248***  -0.026***  -0.044*** 
Spain  -0.405***  -0.620***  -0.445***  -0.492***  -0.082***  -0.081*** 
Finland  0.073*  -0.199***  0.113***  -0.141***  0.008  -0.038*** 
France  -0.232***  -0.173***  -0.182***  -0.232***  -0.029***  -0.036*** 
Greece  -0.525***  -0.845***  -0.477***  -0.591***  -0.112***  -0.121*** 
Ireland  -0.263***  -0.008  -0.249***  -0.221***  0.001  -0.108*** 
Italy  -0.603***  -0.779***  -0.595***  -0.634***  -0.114***  -0.125*** 
Netherlands  0.028  -0.344***  -0.100***  -0.252***  0.007  -0.026*** 
Norway  0.158***  -0.317***  -0.049*  -0.336***  -0.015  -0.056*** 
Portugal  0.295***  -0.006  -0.111***  -0.317***  -0.024**  -0.071*** 
Sweden  0.006  -0.333***  -0.118***  -0.381***  0.010***  -0.036*** 
UK  -0.208***  0.069***  -0.237***  -0.115***  -0.039***  -0.030*** 
Year  &  quarter 
effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Gender  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
1-digit Occupation  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
This table reports the differences (as fractions of a country-specific standard deviation) in 
Socio-Economic Index (SEI) of EU (columns 1-3-5) and non-EU (columns 2-4-6) immigrant 
workers relative to native workers. The values are the estimated coefficients of separate 
regressions by country  of the ISEI index (normalized by its standard deviation) on dummies 
for EU and non-EU immigrants and year-quarter interaction dummies (columns 1-2), and 
other control variables (columns 3-6). Year and quarter effects: year-quarter interaction 
dummies. Gender: dummy for female. Region: regional dummies. Age: dummies for five-year 
age groups. Education: dummies for lower secondary, secondary and tertiary education. 1-
digit occupation: dummies for 1-digit ISCO codes.  
* difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 5%, *** difference significant at 
1% 
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Table 8: Position in national earnings distribution 
Decile of national earnings distribution 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Natives  9.6  9.7  9.3  10.0  10.1  10.4  10.0  10.2  10.4  10.5 
EU15  11.8  10.7  8.2  9.0  8.9  9.2  10.3  10.0  10.8  11.3 
NMS12  18.9  17.3  13.0  13.0  11.1  6.9  7.5  5.5  4.2  2.8 
Other Europe  16.1  15.2  10.9  10.7  9.7  9.2  9.4  8.3  6.7  3.8 
N.Africa  &  Middle 
East  12.8  12.7  12.7  11.4  11.9  8.2  7.5  7.2  7.1  8.6 
Other Africa  13.7  15.2  15.0  11.4  13.2  8.0  6.6  6.3  5.5  5.1 
South and East Asia  17.0  19.7  12.0  13.7  9.0  7.6  6.5  5.3  4.8  4.5 
N.America & Oceania  7.9  6.9  11.6  10.3  10.6  9.2  6.0  9.9  8.6  19.0 
Latin America  20.8  19.8  11.8  9.4  10.4  6.2  5.4  4.7  6.1  5.4 
The table reports the percentage of natives and immigrants in each decile of the national earnings 
distribution in Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and Italy pooled. We define immigrants as 
“foreign born” in all countries except for Germany, where they are defined as foreign nationals. 
Source: EULFS, 2009 
 
 
Table 9: Immigrant-native differential probability of being in bottom earnings decile  
EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU  EU  Non-EU 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Belgium  0.035***  0.054***  0.032***  0.048***  0.029***  0.022*** 
Germany  0.032**  0.065***  0.023*  0.037***  0.016  0.016 
Finland  -0.030  0.114***  -0.016  0.126***  -0.020  0.110*** 
France  0.028***  0.037***  0.029***  0.053***  0.016*  0.032*** 
Italy  0.093***  0.068***  0.073***  0.067***  0.024***  0.016*** 
Quarter effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Gender  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
1-digit Occupation  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
The table reports differences in probability of being in the bottom decile of the national earnings 
distribution between EU (columns 1-3-5) or non-EU (columns 2-4-6) immigrants and natives. 
The values are the estimated coefficients of separate regressions by country of a dummy for being 
in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution on dummies for EU and non-EU immigrants. 
Separate  regressions  are  run  for  each  country.  Quarter  effects:  quarter  dummies.  Gender: 
dummy  for  female.  Age:  dummies  for  five-year  age  groups.  Education:  dummies  for  lower 
secondary, secondary and tertiary education. 
* difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 5%, *** difference significant at 1% 
Source: EU-LFS, 2009. 
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Table 10: Children in Immigrant households 
Percentage of children (<15) who live in an 
immigrant household 
Percentage of immigrants 
in adult population 
EU  Non-EU 
Mixed 






Austria  3.16  17.47  0.66  4.47  4.32  5.21  8.36 
Belgium  4.09  10.69  0.69  3.78  5.11  5.08  5.49 
Germany  1.68  7.97  0.38  2.89  6.05  2.11  3.8 
Spain  1.8  8.04  0.21  2.92  3.43  3.39  8.51 
France  1.68  10.08  0.28  2.94  6.52  2.89  6.99 
Greece  0.93  9.68  0.08  2.16  2.4  1.18  5.4 
Ireland  7.73  4.94  0.61  9.86  2.41  8.96  3.3 
Italy  1.66  7.81  0.17  2.94  3.91  1.72  4.6 
Netherlands  0.84  12.9  0.35  3.11  6.18  1.5  8.14 
Portugal  0.68  5.89  0.32  3.24  6.59  0.54  4.02 
UK  2.12  11.03  0.48  2.37  5.06  3.03  7.44 
Total  1.86  9.43  0.34  2.95  5.16  2.58  5.96 
The left panel of the table reports the share of children under the age of 15 who live in an 
immigrant or a mixed household. The right panel reports the share of immigrants in the total 
population above the age of 15. 
EU (Non-EU) households are defined as households where the reference person and her or his 
spouse – if there is a spouse - is an EU(Non-EU) immigrant. Mixed households are households 
where the reference person and her or his partner have a different immigrant status. We define 
immigrants as “foreign born” in all countries except for Germany, where they are defined as 
foreign nationals. 
Source: EULFS, 2007-2009. 
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Percentage of children (<15) in immigrant 
household out of all children in households 











Belgium  4.88  4.60  6.50  23.01  0.22  2.86  3.39 
Germany  1.15  0.80  0  19.19  0  0  5.25 
France  4.22  3.35  2.54  19.11  0.08  0.69  5.70 
Italy  4.05  3.30  5.55  20.06  0.11  2.01  3.03 
Total  2.98  2.53  3.62  19.84  0.10  1.26  4.57 
The first column of the table reports the percentage of households where the reference person and 
her/his spouse (if they have a spouse with positive earnings) are both in the bottom decile of the 
national earnings distribution.  
Column 2 reports the percentage of children under the age of 15 living in a household with both 
parents (or the lone parent) in the bottom decile of the national earnings distribution. 
Columns 3-7 report the percentage of children under the age of 15 living in an immigrant or a 
mixed household out of total households with both parents (or the lone parent) in the bottom decile 
of the national earnings distribution. 
EU (Non-EU) households are defined as households where the reference person and her or his 
spouse – if there is a spouse - is an EU (Non-EU) immigrant. Mixed households are households 
where the reference person and her or his partner have a different immigrant status. We define 
immigrants as “foreign born” in all countries except for Germany, where they are defined as 
foreign nationals. 
Source: EULFS, 2009. 
    
Figures  
Figure 1: Immigrant-native employment differentials
The figure reports percentage points difference in employment probability between immigrants and 
natives in working age and not in education. Dark columns report unconditional differences (net of 
year and seasonality effects), while light columns report differences conditional on
education, and regional distribution.
The  differences  in  employment  probabilities  are  obtained 
employment  on a dummy for immigrants. Separate regressions by country.
Source: EULFS 2007-2009 
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ntage points difference in employment probability between immigrants and 
natives in working age and not in education. Dark columns report unconditional differences (net of 
year and seasonality effects), while light columns report differences conditional on
education, and regional distribution. 
The  differences  in  employment  probabilities  are  obtained  from  regressions
on a dummy for immigrants. Separate regressions by country. 
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Figure 2: Occupational dissimilarity and years since migration 
 
 
The  figure  plots  the  value  of  the  effective  Duncan  dissimilarity  index  for  occupation  of  EU 
immigrants (top graph) and non-EU immigrants (bottom graph) relative to natives versus years 
since migration in five destination countries. 












































































Figure 3 - Occupational distribution of immigrants and natives 
 
The figure reports differences between kernel density estimates of the distribution of immigrants 
and the distribution of natives across the ISEI scale. 
Source: EULFS 2007-2009 
 
























EU immigrants Non-EU immigrants
Source: EU-LFS, 2007-200947 
 
Figure 4: Immigrant and native earnings distribution 
 
The figure reports the share of natives (circles), EU immigrants (rhomb) and non-EU immigrants 
(squares)  in  each  decile  of  the  national  earnings  distribution  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Finland, 
France and Italy pooled. 
Source: EULFS 2009. 
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Figure 5 - Historical Immigration and occupational dissimilarity 
 
The figure plots for each country the ratio of the share of immigrants in the total population in 1960 
to  the  share  of  immigrants  in  the  total  population  in  2010  versus  the  index  of  occupational 
dissimilarity  between  recent  EU  immigrants  and  natives  (top  figure)  and  recent    non-EU 
immigrants and natives (bottom figure) from Table 6. We define recent immigrants as immigrants 
who have been in the country for no more than two years.  




Figure 6 - Historical immigration and gaps in employment probability 
 
 
The figure plots for each country the ratio of the share of immigrants in the total population in 1960 
to  the  share  of  immigrants  in  the  total  population  in  2010  versus  the  conditional  employment 
probability differentials between recent EU immigrants and natives (top figure) and recent  non-EU 
immigrants and natives (bottom figure). We define recent immigrants as immigrants who have been 
in the country for no more than two years. Gaps in employment probabilities are conditional on 
age, education, region, and gender. 












































0 5 10 15 20
Immigrant share of pop. 1960 / Immigrant share of pop. 2010












































0 5 10 15 20
Immigrant share of pop. 1960 / Immigrant share of pop. 2010



































































0 5 10 15 20
Immigrant share of pop. 1960 / Immigrant share of pop. 2010





























































0 5 10 15 20
Immigrant share of pop. 1960 / Immigrant share of pop. 2010
Employment probability gap, Non-EU immigrants49 
 
Figure 7 - Employment protection legislation and occupational dissimilarity 
 
The figure plots for each country the OECD index of strictness of employment protection legislation 
in year 2008  versus the index of occupational dissimilarity between recent EU immigrants and 
natives (top figure) and recent  non-EU immigrants and natives (bottom figure) from Table 6. We 






Figure 8 - Employment protection legislation and gaps in employment probability 
 
The figure plots for each country the OECD index of strictness of employment protection legislation 
in  year  2008    versus  the  conditional  employment  probability  differentials  between  recent  EU 
immigrants and natives (top figure) and recent  non-EU immigrants and natives (bottom figure). We 
define recent immigrants as immigrants who have been in the country for no more than two years. 













































.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Strictness of EPL















































.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Strictness of EPL


















































.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Strictness of EPL














































.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Strictness of EPL
Employment probability gap, Non-EU immigrants